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Abstract
This position paper formalises an abstract
model for complex negotiation dialogue.
This model is to be used for the bench-
mark of optimisation algorithms ranging
from Reinforcement Learning to Stochas-
tic Games, through Transfer Learning,
One-Shot Learning or others.
1 Introduction
A negotiation is defined as a bargaining process
between two or more parties (each with its own
aims, needs, and viewpoints) seeking to discover a
common ground and reach an agreement to settle
a matter of mutual concern or resolve a conflict.
From a dialogue point of view, one distinguishes
negotiation dialogue from standard dialogue by
the mutual sharing of information1 , by its required
user adaptation2 , and by the non-stationarity in-
duced by its non fully cooperative structure: the
user and system objectives correlate but also dif-
fer to some extent, and they are consequently ad-
versely co-adapting.
Research on negotiation dialogue experiences
a growth of interest. At first, Reinforcement
Learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998), the most
popular framework for dialogue management
in dialogue systems (Levin and Pieraccini,
1997; Laroche et al., 2009; Lemon and Pietquin,
2012), was applied to negotiation with mit-
igated results (English and Heeman, 2005;
Georgila and Traum, 2011; Lewis et al., 2017),
because the non-stationary policy of the op-
posing player prevents those algorithms from
converging consistently. Then, Multi-Agent
Reinforcement Learning (Bowling and Veloso,
2002) was applied but also with convergence
1whereas standard dialogue mainly relies on discovering
the user information or intent,
2whereas standard dialogue, such as form filling applica-
tions, is rather indifferent to the user’s characteristics,
difficulties (Georgila et al., 2014). Finally, re-
cently, Stochastic Games (Shapley, 1953) were
applied successfully (Barlier et al., 2015), with
convergence guarantees, but only for zero-sum
games, which is inconsistent with dialogue since
most tasks are cooperative.
Here, we extend (Laroche and Genevay,
2017)’s abstraction of the negotiation dia-
logue literature applications: (di Eugenio et al.,
2000; English and Heeman, 2005) consider
sets of furniture, (Afantenos et al., 2012;
Efstathiou and Lemon, 2014; Georgila et al.,
2014; Litman et al., 2016; Lewis et al., 2017)
resource trading, and (Putois et al., 2010;
Laroche et al., 2011; El Asri et al., 2014;
Genevay and Laroche, 2016; Laroche and Fe´raud,
2017) appointment scheduling. Indeed, these
negotiation dialogue problems are cast into a
generic agreement problem over a shared set of
options. The goal for the players is to reach an
agreement and select an option. This negotiation
dialogue game can be parametrised to make it
zero-sum, purely cooperative, or general sum.
However, (Laroche and Genevay, 2017) only
consider elementary options: they are described
through a single entity.
We formalise in this paper the game for op-
tions that are compounded in the sense that they
are characterised by several features. For instance,
Tuesday morning is defined by two features: the
day and the moment of the day. Considering com-
pounded options naturally leads to richer expres-
sions, and therefore to a larger set of actions:
I’m available whenever on Tuesday, or I’d pre-
fer in the afternoon. Since the options are ut-
tered in a compounded way, as opposed to their
elementary definition in (Laroche and Genevay,
2017), the state representation also becomes more
complex. This extension allows more realistic
dialogues, and more challenging Reinforcement
Learning, Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning,
and Stochastic Games policy training.
2 The Negotiation Dialogue Game
This section recalls the negotiation dialogue game
as described in (Laroche and Genevay, 2017). The
goal for each participant is to reach an agree-
ment. The game involves a set of m players
P = {pi}i∈[1,m]. Withm > 2, the dialogue game
is said to be multi-party (Asher et al., 2016; ?).
The players consider n options (in resource trad-
ing, an option is an exchange proposal, in appoint-
ment scheduling, it is a time-slot), and the cost to
agree on an option τ is ciτ randomly sampled from
distribution δi ∈ ∆R+ to agree on it. Players also
have a utility ωi ∈ R+ for reaching an agreement.
For each player, a parameter of cooperation with
the other players αi ∈ R is introduced. As a re-
sult, player pi’s immediate reward at the end of
the dialogue is:
Ri(siT ) = ω
i − ciτ + α
i
∑
j 6=i
(ωj − cjτ ) (1)
where siT is the last state reached by player p
i at
the end of the dialogue, and τ is the agreed option.
If players fail to agree, the final immediate rewards
Ri(siT ) = 0 for all players p
i. If at least one
player pj misunderstands and agrees on a wrong
option τ j which was not the one proposed by the
other players, this is even worse: each player pi
gets the cost of selecting option τ i without the re-
ward of successfully reaching an agreement:
Ri(siT ) = −c
i
τ i − α
i
∑
j 6=i
c
j
τ j
(2)
The values of αi give a description of the nature
of the players, and therefore of the game as mod-
elled in game theory (Shapley, 1953). If αi < 0,
player pi is said to be antagonist: he has an inter-
est in making the other players lose. In particular,
if m = 2 and α1 = α2 = −1, it is a zero-sum
game. If αi = 0, player pi is said to be self-
centred: he does not care if the other player is win-
ning or losing. Finally, if αi > 0, player pi is said
to be cooperative, and in particular, if ∀i ∈ [1,m],
αi = 1, the game is said to be fully cooperative
because ∀(i, j) ∈ [1,m]2, Ri(siT ) = R
j(sjT ).
From now on, and until the end of the article,
we suppose that there are only m = 2 players: a
system ps and a user pu. They act each one in
turn, starting randomly by one or the other. They
have four possible actions. ACCEPT(τ)means that
the user accepts the option τ (independently from
the fact that τ has actually been proposed by the
other player; if it has not, this induces the use of
Equation 2 to determine the reward). This act ends
the dialogue. REFPROP(τ) means that the user re-
fuses the proposed option and proposes instead op-
tion τ . ASKREPEAT means that the player asks the
other player to repeat his proposition. And finally,
ENDDIAL denotes the fact that the player does not
want to negotiate anymore, and terminates the di-
alogue.
Understanding through speech recognition of
system ps is assumed to be noisy with a sen-
tence error rate SERus after listening to a user
pu: with probability SER
u
s , an error is made,
and the system understands a random option in-
stead of the one that was actually pronounced.
In order to reflect human-machine dialogue re-
ality, a simulated user always understands what
the system says: SERsu = 0. We adopt the
way (Khouzaimi et al., 2015) generates speech
recognition confidence scores: scorereco =
1
1+e−X
where X ∼ N(c, 0.2) given a user pu,
two parameters (cu⊥, c
u
⊤) with c
u
⊥ < c
u
⊤ are defined
such that if the player understood the right option,
c = cu⊤ otherwise c = c
u
⊥. The further apart the
normal distribution centres are, the easier it will
be for the system to know if it understood the right
option, given the score.
3 Allowing compounded options
This section extends the negotiation dialogue
game recalled in Section 2 with compounded op-
tions. Each option τ is now characterised by a set
of ℓ features: τ = {fkτ }k∈J1,ℓK, with f
k
τ ∈ F
k.
Not all feature combinations might form a valid
option, but for the sake of simplicity, we consider
that the set of the n options contain all of them and
that the cost for inconsistent ones is infinite. This
way, we can express that an option is invalid but
that the user is not aware of it.
The cost of an option needs to be revisited con-
sequently. The costs of two options that only differ
by a feature are similar in general. Without loss of
generality, we define the cost of one player pi for
agreeing on a given option τ as follows:
ciτ = cˆ
i
τ +
ℓ∑
k=1
cˆik, (3)
where cˆik is the cost of agreeing on feature f
k and
cˆiτ is the cost for selecting this option in particular.
In an appointment scheduling negotiation task, the
feature related costs cˆik can generally be consid-
ered as null: there is no correlation between be-
ing booked on Monday morning and being avail-
able on Tuesday morning. Most of the constraints
are therefore expressed in the cˆiτ term. On the
opposite, in a furniture set application, the pref-
erences are expressed on specific features of the
furniture: colour, price, etc. In this case, the con-
straints mainly lie in cˆik terms.
The option-as-features definition naturally in-
duces new ways of expressing one’s prefer-
ences over the option set. The PROPFEA-
TURES(fk1 , fk2 , . . . ) dialogue act replaces the
previously defined REFPROP(τ ): it means that the
speaker wants the kth1 , k
th
2 , . . . features to be set to
values fk1 , fk2 , . . . ASKREPEAT still asks to re-
peat the whole last utterance, but its partial ver-
sion is added: ASKPARTIALREPEAT(k1 , k2, . . . )
consists in asking to repeat values of features
k1, k2, . . . ACCEPT still accepts the last grounded
option, but it can only be performed once all
features have been grounded. Its partial version
is also introduced: PARTIALACCEPT(k1 , k2, . . . )
determines an agreement on the last grounded
value of features k1, k2, . . .
The compounded options imply complex ac-
tions, which in turn imply a complex understand-
ing model: the sentence level understanding rate
and score need to be extended. The sentence er-
ror rate SERus is therefore replaced with a fea-
ture error rate FERus . The same speech recog-
nition confidence score generation is used at the
feature level, meaning that, at each PROPFEA-
TURES, ASKPARTIALREPEAT, and PARTIALAC-
CEPT acts, the player receives an array of feature
values (or feature names), each associated with a
confidence score.
4 Potential use of the complex
negotiation dialogue game
(Genevay and Laroche, 2016) already used the
simple negotiation dialogue game to study
Knowledge Transfer for Reinforcement Learn-
ing (Taylor and Stone, 2009; Lazaric, 2012) ap-
plied to dialogue systems (Gasˇic et al., 2013;
Casanueva et al., 2015). It appears in this paper
that the optimal policies are rather simple. Mak-
ing the interaction process more intricate and more
reality reflecting allows to put the computational
tractability of the methods to the test. Following
the same purpose, one-shot learning (Schaal et al.,
1997; Fei-Fei et al., 2006) may also be used for
negotiation dialogues.
Cooperative co-adaptation in dialogue has
been tackled only in one previous article:
(Chandramohan et al., 2012). Similarly, but for
the adversary case, the negotiation dialogue game
offers a good empirical test bed for a generalisa-
tion to the general-sum games of (Barlier et al.,
2015).
We believe that this line of research is
complementary with the more applied one of
(Lewis et al., 2017) that work on real human di-
alogues and are more focused on dealing with nat-
ural language within a negotiation task. Their mit-
igated results indicate that negotiation generalisa-
tion over simulated users to real users is difficult,
even when the simulated user is trained on human
data.
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